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Ned Markosian (2014) has recently defended a new theory of composition, which he calls regionalism: some 
material objects 𝑥𝑥 compose something if and only if there is a material object located at the fusion of the 
locations of 𝑥𝑥. Markosian argues that regionalism follows from what he calls the subregion theory of parthood 
(STP). Korman and Carmichael (2016) agree. We provide countermodels to show that regionalism does not 
follow from (STP), even together with fourteen potentially implicit background principles. We then show that 
regionalism does follow from five of those background principles together with (STP) and two additional 
principles connecting parthood and location, which we call (Overlap) and (Strong Delegation). While the 
additional principles are not uncontroversial, our conjecture is that many will find them attractive. We conclude 
by mentioning that (Strong Delegation) fills a previously unnoticed gap in the formal theory of location 
presented in Parsons (2007).  	
1. Introduction  
Ned Markosian (2014) defends a new answer to the special composition question: Under what 
circumstances do several material objects compose something? Markosian’s new answer is 
regionalism: ‘Necessarily, for any 𝑥s, there is a 𝑦 composed of those 𝑥s iff there is a region, 𝑟, 
and an object, 𝑧, such that 𝑟 is the fusion of the regions occupied by the 𝑥s and 𝑧 occupies 𝑟’ 
(2014: 82).1 According to regionalism, some material objects compose something if and only if a 
material object is located at the fusion of their locations. For example, two hydrogen atoms and 
an oxygen atom compose something if and only if some material object (a water molecule, 
perhaps) is located at the fusion of those atoms’ locations.  
																																																								
1 Markosian adds that regionalism should be understood as entailing the ground-theoretic thesis that if some 
material objects compose something, then they compose something in virtue of the fact that some material object is 
located at the fusion of their locations (2014: 83). However, as he notes, he argues only for the simpler, non-ground-
theoretic thesis. We too will set ground theory aside. Our results here are necessary preliminaries to any argument 
for the ground-theoretic thesis.   
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Regionalism is consistent with a number of more familiar answers to the special 
composition question. This is because for any particular things 𝑥𝑥 regionalism doesn’t tell us 
whether a material object is located at the fusion of the locations of 𝑥𝑥.2 Markosian’s own view 
is that composition ‘occurs sometimes but not always’. To use his example: the particles that 
make up your brain do compose something (your brain), but your brain and Jeremy Bentham’s 
body do not compose anything. Regionalism is consistent with this because it is consistent with 
the thesis that though there is a material object (your brain) located at the fusion of the locations 
of your brain’s particles, there is no material object (not even a scattered object) located at the 
fusion of the locations of your brain and Bentham’s body. Regionalism is also consistent with 
universalism about composition, the view that for any material objects 𝑥𝑥, some 𝑦 is composed 
of 𝑥𝑥. In fact, regionalism is consistent even with nihilism, the view that no complex objects 
exist. 	
One might complain (with Korman and Carmichael 2016) that this makes regionalism 
uninformative. Again, regionalism doesn’t tell us which regions have complex material objects 
located at them and thus doesn’t tell us whether any particular objects compose a further object. 
However, we think that regionalism is nevertheless an important thesis and that it is worthwhile 
to articulate the best argument for it. Unlike the more familiar answers to the special composition 
question, regionalism tells us something about complex material objects, their parts, and their 
locations. Since the familiar extant theories of composition say nothing about location, none of 
them guarantees both regionalism’s necessity direction (that if some material objects 𝑥𝑥 
compose something, then a material object is located at the fusion of the locations of 𝑥𝑥) and its 
sufficiency direction (that if a material object is located at the fusion of the locations of material 
objects 𝑥𝑥 then 𝑥𝑥 compose something).3  
But both directions are tempting. Consider necessity. If material objects 𝑥𝑥 compose 
something, 𝑦, it is plausible that some material object is located at the fusion of the locations of 𝑥𝑥, namely, 𝑦! Where else would 𝑦 be? Two miles to the left? Platonic Heaven? Now consider 
the sufficiency direction. If a material object 𝑦 is located at the fusion of the locations of material 
objects 𝑥𝑥, many will insist that 𝑥𝑥 must compose something, namely, 𝑦. How could 𝑦 be so 
located without being composed of 𝑥𝑥?  
Even if regionalism does not settle the dispute between the nihilist, the moderate, and the 
universalist, it is an attractive thesis in its own right, and it imposes mereological and locational 
constraints on the more familiar theses. So we think that anyone who is interested in composition 
ought to be interested in what an argument for regionalism would need to look like.  
Markosian argues that regionalism follows from what he calls the subregion theory of 
parthood (STP): for any material objects 𝑥 and 𝑦, ‘𝑥 is a part of 𝑦 iff the region occupied by 𝑥 is 
																																																								
2 Regarding terminology, our notation for plural variables is ‘𝑥𝑥’, etc., whereas Markosian’s is ‘𝑥s’, and we use 
‘material object’ as a synonym for Markosian’s ‘physical object’. 
3 Universalism does entail the sufficiency direction, by entailing that composition always occurs. Nihilism, together 
with the assumption that every material object has a location, entails the necessity direction, by entailing that if 
material objects 𝑥𝑥 compose 𝑦, then each of 𝑥𝑥 is identical to 𝑦.  
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a subregion of the region occupied by 𝑦’ (2014: 73).4 As we will see, regionalism is ambiguous 
between two natural readings. We will show that on neither reading does regionalism follow 
from (STP); on one reading, neither direction of regionalism follows from (STP). After we 
provide the countermodels that establish this, we set out a new argument that yields both 
versions of regionalism. The new argument relies on (STP) but also on several additional 
principles, some of which have been discussed in the literature. These additional principles are 
not uncontroversial. However, we conjecture that many will find them suitable for use in an 
argument for regionalism. 	
2. Preliminaries  
We begin by setting out some assumptions and definitions. We use the language of plural logic, 
supplemented with a primitive two-place predicate for exact location, ‘x@𝑦’, and primitive one-
place predicates for regionhood, ‘Rx’, and material objecthood, ‘Mx’. We give the standard gloss 
of exact location: a material object 𝑥 is exactly located at a region 𝑦 just in case 𝑥 has the same 
size and shape as 𝑦 and bears the same distance relations to things as does 𝑦. For example, if o is 
a material object that is cubical, 1 cubic meter in volume, and 2 meters from object o*, then o is 
exactly located at a region r only if r is also cubical, 1 cubic meter in volume, and 2 meters from 
o*.5    
We also invoke a primitive two-place predicate, ‘x≤ y’, for parthood (being a proper-or-
improper part of), together with predicates for proper parthood, overlapping, and disjointness, all 
defined in the usual ways: for x to be a proper part of y (‘𝑥 < 𝑦’) is for 𝑥 to be a part of but not 
identical to 𝑦; for x to overlap y (‘𝑥 ∘ 𝑦’) is for something to be a part of both 𝑥 and 𝑦; and for 𝑥 
and 𝑦 to be disjoint (‘𝑥 ≀  𝑦’) is for 𝑥 and 𝑦 to not overlap. We take our parthood predicate to 
apply univocally both to material objects and to regions, but everything we say could be restated 
in terms of a parthood predicate for material objects and a subregionhood predicate for regions. 
We formalize (STP) as follows:6 																																																								
4 Markosian (2014: 82-83) attempts a two-part proof of regionalism from (STP). In note 13 we identify the misstep.   
5 While talk of distance relations between points is straightforward, talk of distance relations between non-point-
sized things is less so. But we hope that our gloss has some content and gives the reader a sense of the intended 
meaning of our primitive. (Others who treat exact location as a primitive and gloss it roughly as we do include 
Casati and Varzi (1999), Gibson and Pooley (2006), Gilmore (2006), Sattig (2006), Balashov (2010), Donnelly 
(2010),  Saucedo (2011), Effingham (2015), and Lafrance (2015).) More informative characterizations can be given, 
but at a cost. For example, Parsons (2007) invokes a primitive notion of weak location, glossed as, ‘𝑥 is weakly 
located at 𝑦 iff  𝑦 is not completely free of 𝑥’. He uses this primitive to define exact location: for 𝑥 to be exactly 
located at 𝑦 is for 𝑥 to be weakly located at all and only those entities that overlap (share a part with) 𝑦. This 
definition entails that if 𝑥 is exactly located at 𝑟 and also at 𝑠, then 𝑟 and 𝑠 overlap exactly the same things, which 
friends of multilocation (e.g., Sattig 2006) deny. However, our argument for regionalism rules out multilocation 
anyway, since it relies on Functionality (see §3). So there is no harm in appealing to Parsons’s characterization as a 
fallback option, for those who find our initial gloss of exact location insufficiently informative.       
6 A more literal translation of Markosian’s principle into our formal language is (STP*): 𝑀𝑥 ∧𝑀𝑦 → 
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 (𝑥@𝑟 ∧ 𝑦@𝑠) → (𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ↔ 𝑟 ≤ 𝑠)          (STP) 
(If 𝑥 is located at 𝑟 and 𝑦 located at 𝑠, then 𝑥 is a part of 𝑦 iff 𝑟 is a part of 𝑠.)7 (STP) is an 
‘alignment’ principle, in Saucedo’s (2011) terminology. It requires a kind of mirroring between, 
on one hand, the mereological relations between objects and, on the other, the mereological 
relations between the locations of those objects.8 We follow Markosian (and van Inwagen 
(1990)) and define ‘𝑦 is composed of 𝑥𝑥’ as: 
 𝑦𝐶𝑥𝑥 =!" ∀𝑤∀𝑧 (𝑤 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑤 ≠ 𝑧) → 𝑤 ≀  𝑧 ∧ 
 ∀𝑧(𝑧 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑧 ≤ 𝑦)  ∧ ∀𝑧(𝑧 ≤ 𝑦 → ∃𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ∘ 𝑥))    (Composition) 
(𝑦 is composed of 𝑥𝑥 =!" (𝑖) every two of 𝑥𝑥 are disjoint, (𝑖𝑖) each of 𝑥𝑥 is a part of 𝑦, and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) each part of 𝑦 overlaps at least one of 𝑥𝑥.) As we mentioned, regionalism is ambiguous. 
Markosian frames the view in terms of fusions of regions. But there are different definitions of 
‘fusion’ and Markosian does not say which he intends. So we will distinguish two versions of 
regionalism. The first version results from taking ‘is a fusion of’ to be synonymous with ‘is 
composed of’: 
 (∀𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑀𝑥) ∧ ∀𝑤∀𝑧( 𝑤 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑤 ≠ 𝑧 → 𝑤 ≀  𝑧))  → 
 (∃𝑦 𝑦𝐶𝑥𝑥 ↔ ∃𝑧∃𝑟∃𝑠𝑠(𝑟𝐶𝑠𝑠 ∧𝑀𝑧 ∧ 𝑧@𝑟 ∧ ∀𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → ∃𝑠(𝑠 ≺ 𝑠𝑠 ∧ 𝑥@𝑠)) ∧ 
 ∀𝑠(𝑠 ≺ 𝑠𝑠 → ∃𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑥@𝑠))))                 (Reg!!) 
(If each of 𝑥𝑥 is a material object and every two of 𝑥𝑥 are disjoint, then something is composed 
of 𝑥𝑥 iff there is a 𝑧, an 𝑟, and some 𝑠𝑠 such that (𝑖) 𝑟 is composed of 𝑠𝑠, (𝑖𝑖) 𝑧 is a material 
object, (𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑧 is located at 𝑟, (𝑖𝑣) for each 𝑥 that is one of 𝑥𝑥, there is an 𝑠 that is one of 𝑠𝑠 such 
that 𝑥 is located at 𝑠, and (𝑣) for each 𝑠 that is one of 𝑠𝑠, there an 𝑥 that is one of 𝑥𝑥 such that 𝑥 
																																																																																																																																																																																		𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ↔ ∃𝑧∃𝑢 𝑅𝑧 ∧ 𝑥@𝑧 ∧ ∀𝑤 𝑅𝑤 ∧ 𝑥@𝑤 → 𝑤 = 𝑧 ∧ 𝑅𝑢 ∧ 𝑦@𝑢 ∧ ∀𝑤 𝑅𝑤 ∧ 𝑦@𝑤 → 𝑤 = 𝑢 ∧ 𝑧 ≤ 𝑢))     
(if 𝑥 and 𝑦 are both material objects, then 𝑥 is a part of 𝑦 iff 𝑥 is located at exactly one region, 𝑦 is located at exactly 
one region, and the former region is a part of the latter region.) We prefer to work with (STP), which is more 
manageable. However, we evaluate the argument from (STP) to regionalism against background principles that 
guarantee, e.g., that all and only material objects have locations, that nothing has more than one location, and that 
only regions are locations. Nothing beneficial to Markosian’s argument is lost when we shift from (STP*) to (STP) 
plus the background principles; our criticisms would carry over to a version of Markosian’s argument that invokes 
(STP*).      
7 We use ‘is located at’ as a synonym of ‘is exactly located at’ throughout the paper. For readability, we omit initial, 
wide-scope universal quantifiers. We also omit initial necessity operators that take wide scope over the initial 
universal quantifiers. Nothing will turn on this. For each of the arguments we discuss, the non-modal version of the 
conclusion will be a logical consequence (in plural logic) of the non-modal versions of the premises iff the 
necessitation of the conclusion is a logical consequence (in any standard system of modal plural logic) of the 
necessitations of the premises.    
8 Varzi (2007), Uzquiano (2011), and Leonard (2016) discuss the logical relationships among many such principles. 
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is located at 𝑠.) 9 Less formally, (Reg!!) says that if 𝑥𝑥 are disjoint material objects (‘𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥’), 
then: 𝑥𝑥 compose something (‘𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥’) iff some material object is located at something that is 
composed of those objects’ locations (‘𝐿𝐶𝑥𝑥’). In short: 𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥 → (𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝐿𝐶𝑥𝑥). 
The second version of regionalism, which we call (Reg!"), results from replacing the 
second occurrence of ‘𝐶’ in the formal statement of (Reg!!) with a fusion predicate ‘F’ defined 
as follows: 
 𝑦𝐹𝑥𝑥 =!" ∀𝑧(𝑧 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑧 ≤ 𝑦)  ∧  ∀𝑧(𝑧 ≤ 𝑦 → ∃𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ∘ 𝑥))            (Fusion)  
So defined, fusion is weaker than composition. From the claim that 𝑦 is composed of 𝑥𝑥, it 
follows that 𝑦 is a fusion of 𝑥𝑥. However, it follows from the former claim, but not from the 
latter claim, that no two of 𝑥𝑥 overlap. (Henceforth, unless we explicitly say otherwise, by 
‘fusion’ we will mean the notion defined by (Fusion).) Informally, (Reg!") says that if 𝑥𝑥 are 
disjoint material objects, then: 𝑥𝑥 compose something iff some material object is located at 
something that is a fusion of those objects’ locations (‘𝐿𝐹𝑥𝑥’): 𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥 → (𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝐿𝐹𝑥𝑥). 
Each version of regionalism is logically equivalent to a conjunction of two weaker 
principles, one offering necessary conditions for material composition, the other offering 
sufficient conditions. It will be convenient to have names for the four weaker principles. To 
minimize tedious formalism, we introduce them all at once, in abbreviated form: 
  Necessary condition for material 
composition 
 Sufficient condition for material 
composition 
(Reg𝑪𝑪) equivalent to 
conjunction of 
(Reg𝑪𝑪): 𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥 → (𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥 → 𝐿𝐶𝑥𝑥) and (Reg𝑪𝑪): 𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥 → (𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥 ← 𝐿𝐶𝑥𝑥) 
  ⇓  ⇑ 
(Reg𝑪𝑭) equivalent to 
conjunction of 
(Reg𝑪𝑭): 𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥 → (𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥 → 𝐿𝐹𝑥𝑥) and (Reg𝑪𝑭): 𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥 → (𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥 ← 𝐿𝐹𝑥𝑥) 
The weaker principles result from replacing the biconditional double-arrow in the formal 
statements of (Reg!!) and (Reg!"), respectively, with a single arrow (a material conditional or a 
converse material conditional, ‘←’, as the relevant names indicate). The most important thing to 
																																																								
9 Three points. First, the first clause in the antecedent is included because regionalism is only meant to supply 
conditions for material objects (not, say, regions) to compose something. Second, regarding the second clause of the 
antecedent, we follow Markosian, who writes that ‘[r]egionalism needs to be qualified so that it says “for any non-
overlapping xs . . .”’ (2014: 82, note 26, emphasis original), in light of the disjointness clause in (Composition). 
Third, regarding (𝑖𝑖), we include it for the sake of explicitness, but given our assumption (and Markosian’s) that only 
material objects have locations, it is redundant.    
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see at this stage is that since fusion is weaker than composition, (Reg!!) is weaker than (Reg!"), 
but (Reg!!) is stronger than (Reg!").  
Before moving on, we should note that at least two additional definitions of fusion 
commonly appear in the literature.10 These definitions are equivalent to (Fusion), given classical 
mereology, on which see Hovda (2009). While we will not assume classical mereology, we will 
make some assumptions about regions, which we take to be implicit in Markosian’s discussion, 
that have a similar effect. Given these assumptions, the two additional versions of regionalism 
that result from the additional definitions of fusion are both equivalent to (Reg!"). So we will not 
give them separate treatment.11 
 
3. Countermodels 
Markosian (2014) and Korman and Carmichael (2016) claim that regionalism follows from 
(STP). In fact, neither (Reg!!) nor (Reg!") follows from (STP), even together with a generous 
collection of background principles that might be implicit in Markosian’s discussion.  
We divide the background principles into four groups. The principles in the first group, 
which constitute what Varzi (2016) calls Extensional Mereology, apply unrestrictedly to all 
entities, including regions and material objects. 
Extensional Mereology (EM) 
(1) 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥             (Reflexivity) 
Everything is a part of itself. 
(2)   𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧 → 𝑥 ≤ 𝑧         (Transitivity) 
If 𝑥 is a part of 𝑦, and 𝑦 is a part of 𝑧, then 𝑥 is a part of 𝑧.    
(3) 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥 → 𝑥 = 𝑦                (Anti-symmetry) 
If 𝑥 is a part of 𝑦, and 𝑦 is a part of 𝑥, then 𝑥 = 𝑦.            																																																								
10 Our definition of ‘fusion’, which we take from from Lewis (1991), is what Hovda (2009) calls a ‘Type-2 fusion’, 
framed in plural logic. What Hovda (2009) calls ‘Type-1 fusion’ can be framed in plural logic as: 𝑦 is a T1-fusion of 𝑥𝑥 iff: for all 𝑧, 𝑧 overlaps 𝑦 iff 𝑧 overlaps one of 𝑥𝑥. Finally, the minimal upper bounds (MUB)-style definition, in 
plural logic, is: 𝑦 is a MUB-fusion of 𝑥𝑥 iff each of 𝑥𝑥 is a part of 𝑦 and for all 𝑧, if each of 𝑥𝑥 is a part of 𝑧, then 𝑦 
is a part of 𝑧. (For useful discussion, see Cotnoir 2016.) In the presence of assumptions (1) – (5) and (12) in the main 
text below, the versions of regionalism that result from interpreting ‘F’ as T1-fusion or as MUB-fusion are 
equivalent to (Reg!"). We omit the proof. 
11 Fine (2010) and Kleinschmidt (forthcoming) argue, on different grounds, that ‘fusion’ is primitive and ‘part’ is 
defined. We lack the space to discuss how this shift would affect our project.  	
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(4)  ~𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 →  ∃𝑧 (𝑧 ≤ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ≀ 𝑦)             (Strong Supplementation) 
If 𝑥 is not a part of 𝑦, then 𝑥 has some part 𝑧 that is disjoint from 𝑦.    
Like classical mereology, EM entails that no plurality has more than one fusion. (Proof omitted.) 
But whereas classical mereology entails that every plurality has at least one fusion, EM leaves 
that question open. Thus, unlike classical mereology, EM avoids prejudging the answer to the 
special composition question.   
The principles in the second group, which Markosian (2014: 86) seems to endorse, 
connect parthood with regionhood.  
Parts and Regions (PAR) 
(5) 𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑅𝑥 → ∃𝑦[𝑦𝐹𝑥𝑥 ∧  ∀𝑧(𝑧𝐹𝑥𝑥 → 𝑅𝑧 ]                       (R-Fusion)  
If each of 𝑥𝑥 is a region, then: there is at least one fusion of 𝑥𝑥 and any fusion of 𝑥𝑥 is a 
region. 
(6) 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑅𝑦) → 𝑅𝑥                            (Regional Parts)  
Any part of a region is a region. 
PAR guarantees that every plurality of regions has at least one fusion. Together with EM, this 
entails that every such plurality has exactly one fusion. This leaves it open whether every 
plurality of material objects has a fusion.12  
The principles in the third group concern regionhood, material objecthood, and their 
interaction with each other and with parthood. 
Material Objects and Regions (MOR) 
(7)  [ 𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 → 𝑀𝑥 ∧ 𝑦𝐹𝑥𝑥] → 𝑀𝑦                        (M-Fusion) 
If each of 𝑥𝑥 is a material object and 𝑦 is a fusion of 𝑥𝑥, then 𝑦 is a material object.   
(8)  ~(𝑅𝑥 ∧𝑀𝑥)                         (Exclusivity) 
Nothing is both a region and a material object.         
(9) (𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧𝑀𝑦) → 𝑀𝑥                  (Material Parts) 
Any part of a material object is a material object.                       
These principles enforce a kind of dualism about material objects and regions. 																																																								
12	Although PAR plays no role in Markosian’s argument or ours, we include it to make it explicit that even if it is 
assumed, Markosian’s argument remains invalid. (R-Fusion) does however play a role in securing the equivalence of 
the additional versions of regionalism (mentioned in note 10) to (Reg!").  	
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The principles in the fourth group, which we take to be endorsed by Markosian and in 
some cases implicit in his argument, concern location and its interaction with material 
objecthood and regionhood. 
 Material Objects, Regions, and Location (MRL) 
(10) 𝑀𝑥 → ∃𝑦(𝑥@𝑦)                (Exactness) 
Each material object has a location.  
(11) ∃𝑦(𝑥@𝑦) → 𝑀𝑥            (Objecthood) 
Only material objects have locations.  
(12)  ∃𝑥(𝑥@𝑦) → 𝑅𝑦           (Regionhood) 
All locations are regions. 
(13) 𝑥@𝑦 ∧ 𝑥@𝑧 → 𝑦 = 𝑧         (Functionality) 
Nothing has more than one location.                 
(14)  𝑥@𝑦 ∧ 𝑧@𝑦 → 𝑥 = 𝑧               (Anti-Colocation) 
No two entities share a location.                 
MRL bans non-located material objects, multilocated entities, distinct co-located entities, and 
locations that are non-regions. It does not ban non-located entities in general, nor does it ban 
regions at which nothing is located.  
Note that MRL says nothing about parthood. In particular, it says nothing about how the 
mereological properties of or relations between some objects must mirror the mereological 
properties or relations between the locations of those objects. Making these ‘mirroring’ 
requirements precise is the job of alignment principles such as (STP), which we treat as 
foreground, not background. 
With (1) – (14) in place, we turn to our models. Each model is specified by a Hasse-style 
diagram. In each diagram, the solid nodes represent the material objects in the model and the 
hollow nodes represent the regions in the model. A straight upward-running line connecting a 
node 𝑛 to a higher node 𝑚 represents 𝑛 being a proper part of 𝑚. The downward-pointing arrows 
represent the higher node being located at the lower node. Keep in mind that a model need not 
correspond to a possible or even conceivable situation to make the desired point, which in each 
case is the purely logical point that a given sentence is a not a logical consequence of certain 
other sentences. 




In this model, the complex material object 𝑜 is composed of the simple material objects 𝑜!, 𝑜!, 
and 𝑜!. 𝑜! and 𝑜! do not compose anything. 𝑜 is located at 𝑟, 𝑜! is located at 𝑟!, 𝑜! is located at 𝑟!, and 𝑜! is located at 𝑟!. As the reader can check, (STP) is satisfied in the model. For any case 
in which 𝑥 is located at 𝑠! and 𝑦 is located at 𝑠!, 𝑥 is a part of 𝑦 iff 𝑠! is a part of 𝑠!. (1) – (14) 
are also satisfied in the model, as the reader can also check. But while 𝑟 is a fusion of the 
locations of 𝑜! and 𝑜!, and there is a material object located at 𝑟 in the model, 𝑜! and 𝑜! do not 
compose anything, so (Reg!") is not satisfied. Though note that the model is not a countermodel 
to (Reg!!): 𝑟 is a fusion of 𝑟! and 𝑟!, but 𝑟! and 𝑟! do not compose 𝑟, since they are not disjoint. 
It is also important to see that (Reg!!) fails in the model. The material objects 𝑜!, 𝑜!, and 𝑜! do compose something, 𝑜, but no material object is located at something their locations 
compose. Their locations, which overlap each other, do not compose anything. Though note that 
(Reg!") still holds: there is a material object located at 𝑟, which is the fusion of the locations of 𝑜!, 𝑜!, and 𝑜!. So, whether we disambiguate regionalism via (Composition) or via (Fusion), our 
first model shows that regionalism does not follow from (STP) together with (1) – (14). 
The distinctive feature of the model is that, although it satisfies (STP), it violates a 
similar-looking alignment principle: 
 (𝑥@𝑟 ∧ 𝑦@𝑠) → (𝑥 ∘ 𝑦 ↔ 𝑟 ∘ 𝑠)               (Overlap) 
(If 𝑥 is located at 𝑟 and 𝑦 located at 𝑠, then 𝑥 overlaps 𝑦 iff 𝑟 overlaps 𝑠.) In the model, 𝑜!’s 
location overlaps the locations of 𝑜! and 𝑜!, but 𝑜! overlaps neither 𝑜! nor 𝑜!. It is tempting to 
assume that (Overlap) follows from (STP), but the above model shows that it does not. In fact, 
the two principles are logically independent, as noted by Uzquiano (2011).  
We now provide a countermodel showing that neither (Reg!!) nor (Reg!") follows from 
(STP) and (1) – (14). 
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In this model, there are exactly three material objects. 𝑜! and 𝑜!, are simple, and 𝑜 is complex: 
its parts are itself, 𝑜!, and 𝑜!. 𝑜! is located at 𝑟!, 𝑜! is located at 𝑟!, and 𝑜 is located at 𝑟, which is 
composed of 𝑟!, 𝑟!, and 𝑟!. As the reader can check, (STP) and (1) – (14) are all satisfied in the 
model, as is (Overlap). Objects 𝑜! and 𝑜! compose something. Yet nothing is located at the 
region that is composed of – and fuses – their locations, 𝑟!. So neither (Reg!!) nor (Reg!") is 
satisfied.13 
The distinctive feature of this model is that although it satisfies (STP), (1) – (14), and 
(Overlap), it violates certain ‘delegation’ principles (so named by Gilmore (2009), (2018)).14 
Delegation principles are alignment principles that say, roughly, that complex objects fill up their 
locations by delegation: if 𝑟 is the location of a complex object 𝑜, then no part of 𝑟 is filled by 𝑜 
alone, without the help of some proper part (‘delegate’) of 𝑜. (To fill a region, let us say, is to 
have a location that has the given region as a part.) The delegation principle that will be our 
focus here is: 
 ∃𝑦 𝑦 < 𝑥 ∧ 𝑥@𝑟 → 
 ∀𝑦𝑦(𝑥𝐹𝑦𝑦 → ∀𝑟!(𝑟! ≤ 𝑟 → ∃𝑠∃𝑦!(𝑦! ≺ 𝑦𝑦 ∧ 𝑦!@𝑠 ∧ 𝑟! ∘ 𝑠)))     (Strong Delegation) 																																																								
13 This shows that Markosian’s attempt to derive the necessity direction of regionalism from (STP) must go wrong 
somewhere but does not specify where. For those who are interested, here is the relevant passage from Markosian:  
First we assume . . . STP. Then we also assume of some randomly chosen 𝑥s that there is an object 
composed of those 𝑥s. . . . Call the object composed of the 𝑥s A. It follows immediately from STP plus the 
fact that A is composed of the 𝑥s that [M1] every one of the 𝑥s occupies a subregion of the region occupied 
by A. But from the fact that the 𝑥s compose A we also know that [M2] there is no part of A that fails to 
overlap at least one of the 𝑥s. So we know that [M3] the region occupied by A is the fusion of the regions 
occupied by the 𝑥s.’ (2014: 83, italics added).  
As our model shows, M3 does not follow from M1 and M2.	
14 Kleinschmidt (forthcoming) motivates her claim that ‘fusion’ is primitive in part by its ability to rule out similar 
scenarios, informally described. But the purely mereological system that results does not block our second model, so 
it seems that some delegation principle will still be needed.   
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(If 𝑥 is complex and is located at 𝑟, then for any 𝑦𝑦 of which 𝑥 is a fusion, each part 𝑟! of 𝑟 
overlaps a location of one of 𝑦𝑦.) Two comments. First, the idea is not that all objects must fill 
their locations by delegation. That would rule out simple material objects that have complex, 
extended locations. (For defenses of such objects, see Markosian (1998), Parsons (2000), and 
Simons (2004).) Second, our second model does violate (Strong Delegation). The object 𝑜 is 
complex and is a fusion of 𝑜! and 𝑜!, but there is a part, 𝑟!, of 𝑜’s location that does not overlap 
a location of 𝑜! or of 𝑜!.  
One final remark about our models. We have stated (1) – (14) explicitly, and noted that 
our models satisfy all these principles, to dispel worries about the relevance of those models. The 
fact that the models satisfy (1) – (14) shows that those models target only the most relevant 
aspects of the argument. They do not trade on exotic possibilities about the behavior of parthood, 
as it applies to material objects or as it applies to regions. They do not appeal to distinct fusions 
of the same plurality, or failures of unrestricted fusion for regions, or multilocation, or distinct 
co-located entities, or non-located material objects. The only ‘funny business’ in the models is 
their violation of certain alignment principles. So, even against the background of a well-
behaved parthood relation and a separately well-behaved location relation, (STP) is not strong 
enough to deliver regionalism. Further alignment principles, ensuring that parthood and location 
interact as expected, are required.15 
 
4.  The new argument 
Recall that there are two versions of regionalism on the table: (Reg!!) and (Reg!"). To prove 
that both versions follow from our premises, we will prove the stronger sufficient condition, 
(Reg!"), and the stronger necessary condition, (Reg!!). The countermodels discussed earlier 
satisfied (1) – (14). However, our argument will only rely on five such principles. We will 
refrain from invoking some of the more controversial principles, such as (Anti-Symmetry), 
(Strong Supplementation), (Exclusivity), (Objecthood), or (Anti-Colocation). Nor will we invoke 
(Transitivity), (R-Fusion), (Regional Parts), or (Regionhood), which are widely taken to be 
innocuous.  	
4.1 Premises 
We will show that (Reg!!) and (Reg!") are logical consequences of (STP), (Reflexivity), (M-
Fusion), (Material Parts), (Exactness), and (Functionality), together with (Overlap) and (Strong 
Delegation), and an instance of the plural comprehension schema of plural logic. As attractive as 																																																								
15 We have allowed that (1) – (14) might be implicit premises in Markosian’s argument. Why haven’t we allowed 
that (Overlap) and (Strong Delegation) might be implicit premises too? First, even if (Overlap) and (Strong 
Delegation) are implicit premises, our models still show that regionalism does not follow from the set {(STP), (1) – 
(14)}, which was not antecedently obvious. Second, (Overlap) and (Strong Delegation) are more similar to (STP) 
than to any of (1) – (14). Like (STP), and unlike (1) – (14), they are alignment principles that govern the interaction 
of parthood and location. So, given that Markosian takes pains to make (STP) explicit, it seems that if (Overlap) and 
(Strong Delegation) were meant play a role in the argument, they would have been made explicit as well. 
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these premises may be, they are not uncontroversial, and some objections to them are worth 
highlighting.  
First, as Markosian notes, some think that it is possible for material objects (e.g., bosons) 
to interpenetrate without overlapping, like a ghost and a wall. (See Sanford (1967) and Gilmore 
(2018) for further references and discussion.) This would generate counterexamples to (Overlap) 
and (STP). Second, as Uzquiano (2011: 205) notes, even if one rejects ghost/wall-style 
interpenetration, one might think that disjoint, topologically closed material objects can be in 
perfect contact and have locations that share boundary points as common parts. This is 
inconsistent with (Overlap). Third, Gilmore (2006), Parsons (2007), Kleinschmidt (2016), and 
(Leonard 2014; 2018) note that in the context of non-standard models of space, one might think 
that a material object could fail to have an (exact) location. This is inconsistent with 
(Exactness).16 Fourth, some (e.g., Sattig 2006) think that material objects are multilocated. (See 
Donnelly (2010) and Gilmore (2018) for discussion.) This is inconsistent with (Functionality). 
Fifth, some (e.g., McDaniel (2001), Koslicki (2008)) think that some material objects have, as 
parts, ‘formal components,’ such as tropes or universals, that are not material objects. This is 
inconsistent with (Material Parts). Sixth, according to Cartwright (1975) and Uzquiano (2006), 
material objects can only be located at topologically open regions. Consider an open spherical 
object 𝑜 located at open spherical region 𝑟. 𝑜 is a fusion of two open hemispherical objects, 𝑜! 
and 𝑜!, located at 𝑟! and 𝑟!. Centerpoint 𝑝 of 𝑟 does not overlap 𝑟! or 𝑟! but is a part of 𝑟. This is 
inconsistent with (Strong Delegation).  
So the argument will not carry weight with everyone. We suspect, however, that many 
will find the premises plausible. In any event, our goal is to chart connections, not to proselytize. 
Having shown that Markosian’s argument is invalid, we seek further premises – the more 
plausible, the better – that would suffice to fill the gaps. Friends of the premises acquire a new 
route to regionalism; skeptics come to see how hard it is to repair Markosian’s argument. 
Everyone learns something.  
 
4.2 Proof of validity 
Our proof comes in two steps: in the first we prove (Reg!"); in the second we prove (Reg!!).  
Step one. Recall that we abbreviated (Reg!") as: 𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥 → (𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥 ← 𝐿𝐹𝑥𝑥). So, to prove 
this principle, we will consider some arbitrary things that satisfy ‘𝐷𝑀’ and ‘𝐿𝐹’, and we will 
show that they must satisfy ‘𝐶𝑆’ as well. Let 𝑥𝑥 be arbitrary material objects each two of which 
are disjoint, and which are such that there is a 𝑧, an 𝑟, and some 𝑠𝑠, such that (a) 𝑟 is a fusion of 𝑠𝑠, (b) 𝑧 is a material object, (c) 𝑧 is located at 𝑟, (d) for each 𝑥 that is one of 𝑥𝑥, there is an 𝑠 
that is one of 𝑠𝑠 such that 𝑥 is located at 𝑠, and (e) for each 𝑠 that is one of 𝑠𝑠, there is an 𝑥 that 
is one of 𝑥𝑥 such that 𝑥 is located at 𝑠. We need to show that something 𝑦 is composed of 𝑥𝑥. 
We will do this by showing that 𝑧 itself is composed of 𝑥𝑥. Given the definition of composition, 																																																								
16 These authors actually discuss a related principle: if 𝑥 is weakly located somewhere, then 𝑥 is exactly located 
somewhere. But their cases also threaten our principle. 
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we need to check that three conditions hold: (𝑖) each two of 𝑥𝑥 are disjoint; (𝑖𝑖) each of 𝑥𝑥 is a 
part of 𝑧; and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) every part of 𝑧 overlaps at least one of 𝑥𝑥. 
Condition (𝑖). This is true by hypothesis. 
Condition (𝑖𝑖). Consider an arbitrary 𝑎 that is one of 𝑥𝑥. By (d), 𝑎 is located at 
something, call it 𝑠*, that is one of 𝑠𝑠. Then, since 𝑟 is a fusion of 𝑠𝑠, it follows by the definition 
of fusion that 𝑠* is a part of 𝑟. But since 𝑎 is located at 𝑠*, 𝑧 is located at 𝑟, and 𝑠* is a part of 𝑟, 
it follows by (STP) that 𝑎 is a part of 𝑧. But 𝑎 was arbitrary, so condition (𝑖𝑖) is true. 
Condition (𝑖𝑖𝑖). Assume for reductio that there is a part of 𝑧, call it 𝑥!, that doesn’t 
overlap any of 𝑥𝑥. By (Material Parts), we know that 𝑥! is a material object. So by (Exactness), 
we know that 𝑥! must have a location, say, 𝑠!. By hypothesis we know that 𝑧 is located at 𝑟. So 𝑧 
is located at 𝑟 and 𝑥′ is located at 𝑠′ and 𝑥′ is a part of 𝑧, from which it follows by (STP) that 𝑠′ is 
a part of 𝑟. We also know, by hypothesis, that 𝑟 is a fusion of 𝑠𝑠. By the definition of fusion, 
then, any part of 𝑟 overlaps at least one of 𝑠𝑠. Recall 𝑠! is a part of 𝑟. So 𝑠′ overlaps one of 𝑠𝑠. 
But if 𝑠! overlaps one of 𝑠𝑠 (which by hypothesis is a location of one of 𝑥𝑥), then by (Overlap) 
we know that 𝑥! overlaps at least one of 𝑥𝑥, which contradicts our initial assumption and 
completes our reductio. Therefore, condition (𝑖𝑖𝑖) holds. Since conditions (𝑖)-(𝑖𝑖𝑖) hold, (Reg!") 
is true. 
Step two. Now we turn to (Reg!!), which we abbreviated as: 𝐷𝑀𝑥𝑥 → (𝐶𝑆𝑥𝑥 → 𝐿𝐶𝑥𝑥). 
Consider arbitrary material objects 𝑥𝑥 each two of which are disjoint and an arbitrary 𝑦 
composed of 𝑥𝑥. We need to show that there is a 𝑧, an 𝑟, and some 𝑠𝑠 such that five conditions 
hold: (𝑖) 𝑟 is composed of 𝑠𝑠, (𝑖𝑖) 𝑧 is a material object, (𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑧 is located at 𝑟, (𝑖𝑣) for each 𝑥 that 
is one of 𝑥𝑥, there is an 𝑠 that is one of 𝑠𝑠 such that 𝑥 is located at 𝑠, and (𝑣) for each 𝑠 that is 
one of 𝑠𝑠, there an 𝑥 that is one of 𝑥𝑥 such that 𝑥 is located at 𝑠. 
Since each of 𝑥𝑥 is a material object, by (Exactness), each of 𝑥𝑥 has a location. Since 
something is a location of one of 𝑥𝑥, by (Plural Comprehension)17 we know that there are some 
things that are all and only the locations of one or another of 𝑥𝑥.18 Call these things 𝑠𝑠*. So: each 
of 𝑥𝑥 is located at one of 𝑠𝑠*, and each of 𝑠𝑠* is such that one of 𝑥𝑥 is located at it, which means 
that 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑠𝑠* jointly satisfy (𝑖𝑣) and (𝑣). 
We can turn now to conditions (𝑖), (𝑖𝑖), and (𝑖𝑖𝑖). We know that 𝑦 is composed of 𝑥𝑥. 
Hence we know, by the definitions of composition and fusion, that 𝑦 is a fusion of 𝑥𝑥. We also 
know that each of 𝑥𝑥 is a material object. It follows, by (M-Fusion), that 𝑦 is a material object. 
So, by (Exactness) and (Functionality), we know that 𝑦 has exactly one location, call it 𝐿!. We’ll 
show that 𝐿! is composed of 𝑠𝑠*, which will secure conditions (𝑖), (𝑖𝑖), and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) and complete 
our proof. 
																																																								
17 (Plural Comprehension): ∃𝑥𝜑(𝑥) → ∃𝑦𝑦∀𝑧(𝑧 ≺ 𝑦𝑦 ↔ 𝜑(𝑧)); if something is 𝜑, there are some things 𝑦𝑦 such 
that for all 𝑧, 𝑧 is one of 𝑦𝑦 iff 𝑧 is 𝜑.  
18 We substitute ‘∃𝑥!(𝑥! ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑥!@𝑥)’ for ‘𝜑(𝑥)’ in (Plural Comprehension). 
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We know that 𝑦 is composed of 𝑥𝑥, hence that (a) each of 𝑥𝑥 is a part of 𝑦. We also 
know that (b) 𝑦 is located at 𝐿!. Finally, we know that (c) for each of 𝑠𝑠*, one of 𝑥𝑥 is located at 
it. Together with (STP), (a) – (c) entail that (d) each of 𝑠𝑠* is a part of 𝐿!. So, in order to show 
that 𝐿! is composed of 𝑠𝑠*, it will suffice to prove two more things, namely, that (e) each part of 𝐿! overlaps at least one of 𝑠𝑠*; and that (f) each two of 𝑠𝑠* are disjoint. We will prove (e) by 
cases, of which there are two.  
Case one: 𝑦 does not have any proper parts. In other words, every part of 𝑦 is identical to 𝑦. So, given that 𝑥𝑥 compose 𝑦 – and hence each of 𝑥𝑥 is a part of 𝑦 – it follows that each of 𝑥𝑥 
is identical to 𝑦. So each of the locations of 𝑥𝑥 – i.e., each of 𝑠𝑠*  – is identical to a location of 𝑦. We already know that there is exactly one location of 𝑦, namely, 𝐿!. So each of 𝑠𝑠* is 
identical to 𝐿!. Trivially, each part of 𝐿! overlaps 𝐿!. (This is guaranteed by (Reflexivity) and 
the definition of ‘overlap’.) So, each part of 𝐿! overlaps at least one of 𝑠𝑠* (namely, 𝐿!). This 
means that (e) holds. 
Case two: 𝑦 has at least one proper part. Then, since 𝑦 has a location (namely, 𝐿!), the 
antecedent of (Strong Delegation) is satisfied, and we can conclude that (g) for any things 𝑧𝑧 of 
which 𝑦 is a fusion and for any 𝑢, if 𝑢 is a part of 𝐿! then 𝑢 overlaps a location of one of 𝑧𝑧. 
Now let 𝑠′ be an arbitrary part of 𝐿!. Since 𝑦 is a fusion of 𝑥𝑥, and 𝐿! is a location of 𝑦, and 𝑠′ is 
a part of 𝐿!, by applying (g) we get the result that 𝑠′ overlaps a location of one of 𝑥𝑥; that is, 𝑠′ 
overlaps one of 𝑠𝑠*. Since 𝑠′ was arbitrary, we can conclude that each part of 𝐿! overlaps at least 
one of 𝑠𝑠*: (e) holds. 
So, whether 𝑦 has any proper parts or not, each part of 𝐿! overlaps at least one of 𝑠𝑠*. 
Given our earlier result that each of 𝑠𝑠* is a part of 𝐿!, it follows that 𝐿! is a fusion of 𝑠𝑠*. Now, 
to show that 𝐿! is composed of 𝑠𝑠*, all that remains is to prove that (f) each two of 𝑠𝑠* are 
disjoint.  
Assume for reductio that (f) is false, i.e., that there are non-identical but overlapping 
entities among 𝑠𝑠*: call them 𝑠! and 𝑠!. Since 𝑠! and 𝑠! are among 𝑠𝑠*, we know that one of 𝑥𝑥, 
call it 𝑥!, is located at 𝑠!, and that one of 𝑥𝑥, call it 𝑥!, is located at 𝑠!. Since 𝑠! and 𝑠! are non-
identical, we know by (Functionality) that 𝑥! and 𝑥! are non-identical. Since 𝑥! and 𝑥! are located 
at 𝑠! and 𝑠!, respectively, and 𝑠! and 𝑠! overlap, it follows by (Overlap) that 𝑥! and 𝑥! overlap as 
well. But this contradicts our assumption that each two of 𝑥𝑥 are disjoint. So we can conclude 
that (f) is true: each two of 𝑠𝑠* are disjoint. It follows that 𝐿! is composed of 𝑠𝑠*.  
We started with some arbitrary material objects 𝑥𝑥 and an arbitrary 𝑦 composed of 𝑥𝑥, 
and we showed that there is there is a 𝑧 (specifically, 𝑦) an 𝑟 (specifically, 𝑦’s location, 𝐿!), and 
some 𝑠𝑠 (specifically, 𝑥𝑥’s locations, 𝑠𝑠*) such that five conditions hold: (𝑖) 𝑟 is composed of 𝑠𝑠, (𝑖𝑖) 𝑧 is a material object, (𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑧 is located at 𝑟, (𝑖𝑣) for each of 𝑥𝑥 is located at one of 𝑠𝑠, and 




5.  Conclusion 
We first showed that neither version of regionalism follows from (STP), even together with (1) – 
(14). We then showed that both versions of regionalism follow from a different collection of 
premises, which includes (Overlap) and (Strong Delegation).  
We close by noting a further application of (Strong Delegation). The influential theory of 
location presented in Parsons (2007)19 is satisfied by our second model. This shows, we think, 
that Parsons’s theory is too weak. Though the theory may be true, it is not the whole truth about 
the logic of location. Any comprehensive formal theory of location should block our second 
model. The theory of Casati and Varzi (1999: 122) blocks the model with an axiom equivalent to 
(Arbitrary Partition): if 𝑥 is located at 𝑟 and 𝑟* is a part of 𝑟, then there is a part of 𝑥 that is 
located at 𝑟*. However, since (Arbitrary Partition), together with (Functionality), rules out 
simple objects with complex, extended locations, which Parsons (2000), (2007) and Markosian 
(1998) want to allow, they reject (Arbitrary Partition). Without it, they are left with nothing to 
rule out our second model. We offer (Strong Delegation), which blocks that model but is friendly 
to simple objects with complex, extended locations.20  21 
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